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THE VIOLENCE OF NOSY QUESTIONS 
JEANNINE BELL 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay examines a little-studied aspect of police procedure: police 
officers’ unfettered power to ask questions of motorists. The questions officers 
ask after they have stopped a car can run the gamut from questions about the 
nature of the motorist’s travel plans to nosy personal questions. Such questions 
are often intrusive, and drivers report feeling degraded by having to answer 
them. This Essay argues that these questions should be regulated because giving 
officers complete control over what they ask motorists provides a significant 
space for racial discrimination in policing, creates resentment, and encourages 
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INTRODUCTION 
Where are you from? What are you doing here? Where are you headed? Do 
you have any weapons on you? Can I take a look inside your car? How long 
have you been here? What do you do for a living? These are nosy questions—
questions unrelated to the matter at hand, and the person asking the questions 
really does not need to know the answers. Individuals confronted with such 
probing inquiries are likely to find them intrusive or embarrassing. Though it is 
normally most people’s impetus to resist or deflect such lines of inquiry, the 
Supreme Court has empowered one group of individuals to demand responses 
to nosy questions—police officers. The law has transformed contemporary 
policing into a space where police officers are empowered to ask any citizen all 
sorts of nosy questions that are clearly fishing expeditions—entirely unrelated 
to the reason for which the individual has been stopped. 
Though citizens may find such questions intrusive, Graham v. Connor1 
provides a cautionary tale regarding citizens’ abilities to resist such inquiries. 
Graham involved the most innocent of victims. Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, 
asked his friend William Berry to drive him to a convenience store so he could 
purchase orange juice to avert a diabetic reaction.2 The convenience store had a 
long line, so Graham elected to leave without purchasing anything. M.S. Connor, 
a police officer, saw Graham quickly enter and leave and found this behavior 
suspicious. Connor made an investigative stop of Berry’s car. In response to 
Connor’s questions about the convenience store, Berry indicated that Graham 
was having a “sugar reaction.”3 While Connor was at his car calling for backup, 
Graham exited the car, ran around it twice, and sat down on the curb, eventually 
fainting. One of the officers who responded cuffed Graham’s hands tightly 
behind his back. Several other officers lifted Graham’s prostrate body from 
behind, carried him to Berry’s car, and dropped his body face down on the 
automobile’s hood.4 In response to Graham’s request that officers look in his 
wallet for the diabetic decal he carried, one officer responded, “Shut up!” and 
slammed Graham’s face against the car hood.5 Next, Graham was roughly 
carried to the back of a police squad car and thrown in the back headfirst.6 He 
was released when officers learned that nothing untoward had occurred at the 
convenience store.7 
As a result of his encounter with the police, Graham sustained multiple 
injuries. His foot was broken, his wrists were cut, his forehead was bruised, and 
 
1 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
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he developed longstanding ringing in his ears.8 In response to his 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claim against the officers, the Supreme Court evaluated whether the 
officers involved had used excessive force against Graham during the stop. 
Ultimately, despite Graham’s injuries and obvious innocence, it was not clear to 
the Court that the officers had used unreasonable force. Justice Rehnquist noted 
that claims of excessive force must be evaluated using an objective standard 
recognizing that officers must make quick, in-the-moment decisions as 
situations change.9 As Justice Rehnquist noted, quoting Johnson v. Glick,10 “Not 
every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a 
judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.”11 By focusing on the 
“evolving situation” that investigatory stops can be and turning a blind eye to 
the officers’ unnecessarily cruel behavior toward someone who they had been 
told was ill, the Court’s decision in Graham gives law enforcement officers a 
substantial grant of discretion. Because of the extraordinary facts in Graham—
a diabetic experiencing insulin shock failed to respond to police and was treated 
roughly—one logical extension of Graham is that if a citizen fails to respond to 
a police officer’s questions for any reason at all, the police officer can continue 
the fishing expedition, even if the citizen is entirely innocent and the officer’s 
actions cause physical harm to the citizen. 
This Essay questions the wisdom of the Court’s decision to turn a blind eye 
to nosy questions. Part I begins with an exploration of officers’ use of these 
questions and the rationale behind these fishing expeditions, followed by an 
analysis of the doctrinal support for officers’ ability to make such inquiries. This 
Essay argues that such questions stem from the ability of police officers to make 
investigatory stops. Part II draws attention to the danger of this line of 
questioning, arguing that such questions encourage the police to racially 
discriminate and to engage in violent behavior. Part III highlights a case in which 
the Oregon Supreme Court determined that police officers’ questions during a 
traffic stop should be regulated. This Essay concludes with a call to the courts 
to help restore trust, preserve citizen dignity, and decrease disruption to police 
by curtailing investigatory stops and consequently decreasing (if not eliminating 
altogether) the intrusive and embarrassing practice of nosy questions.  
I. COPS’ NOSY QUESTIONS 
A. The Inquiries: What Do Cops Ask? 
Violent confrontations can begin with nosy questions. Take for instance the 
2015 encounter between Brian Encinia, a white police officer, and Sandra Bland, 
a black woman. Encinia stopped Bland for a minor traffic violation. The 
exchange below is part of the transcript of Encinia’s initial encounter with 
 
8 Id. at 390. 
9 Id. at 395-97. 
10 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), abrogated by Graham, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
11 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted) (quoting Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033). 
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Bland, recorded by the officer’s dash cam, as soon as he approached her car. 
Nosy questions are italicized for emphasis. 
ENCINIA: Hello ma’am . . . . [T]he reason for your stop is because you 
failed to signal the lane change. Do you have your driver’s license and 
registration with you? What’s wrong? How long have you been in Texas? 
BLAND: Got here just today. 
ENCINIA: OK. Do you have a driver’s license? [Pause.] OK, where you 
headed to now?12 
The first nosy question Encinia asks—”What’s wrong?”—is the least 
pernicious. He may have gotten the sense from Bland’s demeanor that something 
was wrong and wanted to respond to it. Though it appears not to have been 
motivated by a desire to investigate Bland, there are two indications that 
Encinia’s question likely wasn’t motivated by concern for her well-being, either. 
First, Encinia did not wait for a response before asking an unrelated follow-up 
question. Second, following Bland’s nonresponse, Encinia showed little concern 
for trying to address any of Bland’s (uncommunicated) potential problems. 
Encinia next asks Bland how long she had been in Texas and where she was next 
headed. The follow-up is clearly a nosy question of the most intrusive variety—
these questions are entirely unrelated to the reason for the stop, which was a 
traffic stop for failure to signal. 
Though police may see nosy questions like the ones in Encinia and Bland’s 
exchange as harmless and part and parcel of their jobs, another way of viewing 
these questions is as purely nosy fishing expeditions for any potential evidence 
to indict the citizen. While officers may view such questions as innocuous, these 
questions intrude upon “the privacy and personal security of individuals” 
because they are entirely disconnected from the reason for the stop.13 In the 
example above, Encinia told Bland that the reason for the stop was for failing to 
use a turn signal. Questions related to the stop might have been: “Why didn’t 
you use your turn signal? Is your turn signal broken?” Furthermore, the two 
questions that Encinia did ask—”How long have you been in Texas?” and 
“Where you headed to now?”—are personally intrusive.  
The mere asking of such questions by a police officer—a government official 
with a badge and gun—is sharply reminiscent of the ways in which South 
 
12 Ryan Grim, The Transcript of Sandra Bland’s Arrest Is as Revealing as the Video, 
HUFFPOST (July 22, 2015, 11:10 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sandra-bland-arrest-
transcript_n_55b03a88e4b0a9b94853b1f1 [https://perma.cc/4KL5-ZZEE] (emphases 
added). 
13 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976), citing United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (involving border patrol stop and questioning of 
motorists at designated checkpoint). 
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Africa’s apartheid-era policer officers enforced pass laws.14 Additionally, the 
timing of Encinia’s questions adds insult to injury. As noted above, Bland was 
stopped simply for failing to signal—a very minor violation; nevertheless, she 
was asked to respond to a number of unrelated personal questions.15 
Encinia’s questions are not only clearly intrusive and indicative of a lack of 
respect for Bland but more importantly such questions also negatively—and 
unsurprisingly—shape exchanges between drivers and police officers. The 
remainder of Bland’s interaction with Encinia picks up after Encinia went to his 
police cruiser for several minutes before returning to Bland’s vehicle:  
ENCINIA: OK, ma’am. [Pause.] You OK? 
BLAND: I’m waiting on you. This is your job. I’m waiting on you. 
When’re you going to let me go? 
ENCINIA: I don’t know, you seem really irritated. 
BLAND: I am. I really am. I feel like it’s crap what I’m getting a ticket 
for. I was getting out of your way. You were speeding up, tailing me, so I 
move over and you stop me. So yeah, I am a little irritated, but that doesn’t 
stop you from giving me a ticket, so [inaudible] ticket. 
ENCINIA: Are you done?16 
The exchange continues in this manner for several more minutes with Encinia 
eventually asking Bland to put out her cigarette.17 After she refuses to put out 
the cigarette, he asks her to step out of her car. When she refuses, he tells her 
that he is going to yank her out of the car before reaching inside. A few sentences 
later, he tells her that she is under arrest: 
ENCINIA: I said get out of the car! 
BLAND: Why am I being apprehended? You just opened my — 
ENCINIA: I’m giving you a lawful order. I’m going to drag you out of 
here. 
BLAND: So you’re threatening to drag me out of my own car? 
ENCINIA: Get out of the car! 
 
14 From the 1930s through the 1960s, South Africa had an internal passport system 
designed to restrict the movement of black South Africans, requiring them to remain in 
particular areas. Police officers were empowered to stop citizens at any time and ask for their 
passports, and violators of these “pass” laws were subject to arrest and prosecution. See Keith 
Shear, At War with the Pass Laws? Reform and the Policing of White Supremacy in 1940s 
South Africa, 56 HIST. J. 205, 207 (2013) (describing pass laws that “entitled the police at any 
time to demand that Africans show them a properly endorsed document or face arrest, [which] 
hindered Africans’ freedom of movement, restricted where they could reside, and tied them 
to their white employers, underpinning a system of cheap labour and humiliating subjection”). 
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BLAND: And then you’re going to [crosstalk] me? 
ENCINIA: I will light you up! Get out! Now! [Draws stun gun and points 
it at Bland.] 
 . . . . 
BLAND: For a fucking failure to signal. My goodness. Y’all are 
interesting. Very interesting. 
 . . . . 
BLAND: [Cries.] For a fucking traffic ticket, you are such a pussy. You 
are such a pussy.18 
Bland was arrested for suspicion of assaulting a public servant. She was found 
hanging in her jail cell three days after her arrest.19 Encinia later claimed that he 
feared for his personal safety at multiple times during the encounter with 
Bland.20 He was fired by the Texas Department of Public Safety for lying on his 
report.21 
Encinia’s own post hoc description of the stop suggests that the stop had 
nothing to do with the reason he provided to Bland. Encinia described the stop 
as being based on a hunch that Bland was suspicious.22 Taking together 
Encinia’s “hunch” and the nosy questions he asked of Bland raises the question 
of whether this stop was really for investigatory purposes. Even if Encinia was 
less than forthcoming about his real reason for stopping Bland, the stop was 
legally permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the Supreme Court 
has held that pretextual stops are constitutional.23 
Though it began with a minor traffic violation, the encounter between Bland 




20 Brian Collister, Trooper Fired for Sandra Bland Stop: “My Safety Was in Jeopardy,” 




23 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these cases foreclose 
any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual 
motivations of the individual officers involved.”). 
24 Tim Elfrink, ‘Open Up the Case, Period.’: Sandra Bland’s Family Demands Answers 
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settled a wrongful death lawsuit against the Texas Department of Public Safety 
and Waller County for $1.9 million.25 
II. THE DANGER OF NOSY QUESTIONS 
A. Wide Open Spaces for Police Discretion 
Nosy questions are the Wild West of constitutional criminal procedure. In 
sharp contrast to how the Supreme Court has treated these particular types of 
questions, the Court has carefully regulated police officers’ interactions with 
citizens in almost all other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The 
Constitution dictates that searches and seizures be reasonable.26 Thus, police 
stops are heavily regulated.  
Beginning with Terry v. Ohio,27 the Supreme Court has held that police 
officers must have reasonable suspicion to stop an individual.28 The Supreme 
Court has refined what it means to be stopped and whether an individual has 
been officially detained, defining a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes 
as the use of “physical force or a show of authority” to restrict a person’s 
“freedom of movement.”29 Because the Court has defined the stop as the 
intrusion that matters, other interactions that do not rise to the level of a stop are 
irrelevant from a constitutional perspective.30 This means that all questions 
directed at an individual who has not been “stopped” are fair game, and simply 
approaching an individual and asking questions does not mean that this person 
has been stopped for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. 
Mendenhall,31 the Supreme Court made clear that police are allowed to 
“encounter” individuals and ask them questions.32 In this case, Drug 
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) agents observed Sylvia Mendenhall at the 
Detroit Metropolitan Airport and approached her because they suspected her of 
 
25 Johnathan Silver, Sandra Bland’s Family Settles Wrongful Death Lawsuit, Lawyer Says, 
TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 15, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/09/15/sandra-
blands-family-settles-wrongful-death-lawsui/ [https://perma.cc/425-Q78V]. 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
27 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
28 Id. at 21. 
29 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980); see also, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 19 (rejecting notions that “Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation 
upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a ‘technical arrest’ or a ‘full-
blown search’”). 
30 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553. 
31 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
32 See id. at 553 (“[C]haracterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police 
as a ‘seizure,’ while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would 
impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement 
practices.”). 
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being a drug courier.33 The DEA agents asked for her ticket and identification. 
After she surrendered her documents, the agents noted that her ticket and 
identification were in different names.34 They asked her to accompany them to 
a DEA office for further questioning. In the office, a DEA agent asked to search 
Mendenhall’s purse and then asked her to disrobe, but “told her that she had the 
right to decline the search if she desired.”35 She balked at the latter request, 
saying she had a plane to catch. Agents told Mendenhall that she would be fine 
if she had nothing to hide, and so she began to disrobe. Mendenhall eventually 
handed over two packets of drugs that were hidden in her undergarments.36 The 
Court ultimately found that because Mendenhall technically retained the right to 
disregard the agents’ questions and still had a right to leave throughout the 
encounter, the encounter did not rise to a stop—or “seizure”—and thus the line 
of questioning did not violate her constitutional rights.37 Only once an individual 
is actually “seized” will courts become concerned over questions such as those 
seen in Mendenhall. Even then, the courts’ inquiry ignores the content of these 
questions unless the questioning impacts how long the citizen is being detained, 
though some courts have begun to consider the content of the questions as they 
relate to the reason for the stop.38 
B. Discrimination and Discretion 
One of the biggest problems with creating a space that allows unfettered 
police discretion is the problem of discrimination. There is significant evidence 
of police discretion in investigatory stops being aimed at racial and ethnic 
minorities.39 Empirically, a rich history of research suggests that police officers 
around the country make discriminatory stops based on race. Surveying this 
research, social scientists Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald 
Haider-Markel describe the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in 
investigatory stops throughout the United States in their book, Pulled Over: How 
Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship.40 Racial discrimination in police 
stops, they noted, has been found in every type of police department: 
 
33 Id. at 547-48. 
34 Id. at 548. 
35 Id. at 548-49. 
36 Id. at 549. 
37 Id. 
38 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
39 See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 93-96 (2017) (citing data 
showing that “African American men are the primary targets of stop-and-frisk policing in 
Chicago, Boston, Newark, and Philadelphia”); CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY 
& DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND 
CITIZENSHIP 52-73 (2014) (discussing who is stopped by police and why, arguing that officers’ 
racial biases are “activated by and in the practice of making investigatory stops”). 
40 See EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 39, at 22. 
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Numerous studies have found racial disparities in police stops throughout 
the country: in the dense multiracial and multiethnic coastal cities of Los 
Angeles and New York City, but also the large Midwestern sprawls of 
Wichita, Kansas, and St. Louis, Missouri; in progressive, reform-oriented 
police departments like those in some of the Kansas City jurisdictions, but 
also traditional “political” departments like that of Boston; on major 
interstate highways in Maryland and New Jersey but also rural highways 
in Louisiana.41 
The ubiquity of discrimination suggests that racial disparity in police stops is 
inextricably tied to the institution of American policing. No police department 
in any area of the country, regardless of the type or size of the department, has 
been able to effectively eliminate racial profiling. 
Other, more comprehensive analyses of racial disparities in police stops 
support this proposition. The Stanford Open Policing Project, originally 
launched in 2015, examines possible racial bias in policing using an 
interdisciplinary team of statisticians, computer scientists, and journalists.42 
Researchers with the Project filed public records requests in each state to get the 
details of each stop carried out by the police over a ten-year period.43 Although 
only thirty-one states complied with the request, as of 2017, the Project amassed 
a collection of 100 million records.44 The Project’s data showed that officers 
elected to search black and Hispanic drivers’ cars on the basis of less evidence 
than those of white drivers.45 Like other research showing the pervasiveness of 
the problem, the Project noted, “This double standard was widespread, not 
confined to any one state or geographic region.”46 
This discrimination in policing extends to the use of nosy questions as well. 
One of the closest examinations of investigatory stops was performed by Epp 
and his colleagues. Their book was based on surveys of more than 2000 
individuals in the Kansas City area.47 It focused closely on the interactions that 
individuals have with police officers. Epp and his coauthors identified two types 
of discretionary stops: traffic-safety stops and investigatory stops.48 They found 
 
41 Id. 
42 Sharad Goel & Cheryl Phillips, Police Data Suggests Black and Hispanic Drivers Are 




44 Id. (“The remaining 19 had a variety of responses: Some didn’t collect the data in 




47 See EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 39, at 20. 
48 Id. at 14-15. 
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that, in traffic-safety stops, officers primarily use their discretion to enforce 
traffic laws and their racial biases are not triggered.49  
Conversely, the purpose and racial distribution of investigatory stops are 
different than those of traffic-safety stops. Whereas traffic-safety stops are 
triggered by violations of the traffic law, investigatory stops are triggered by an 
officer’s suspicion of criminal activity.50 Though traffic-law enforcement may 
be offered to a driver (or to a court) as a justification, investigatory stops “are 
made not to enforce traffic laws or vehicle codes but to investigate the driver.”51 
Epp and his coauthors find that officers’ racial biases are “activated by and in 
the practice of making investigatory stops,” as police target black citizens, 
particularly young black men.52 Thus, racial disparities in police stops are 
concentrated in investigatory stops.53 
Police carry out investigatory stops in an entirely different manner than 
traffic-safety stops. Officers are typically brief and circumspect in traffic-safety 
stops.54 In investigatory stops, however, officers are rarely succinct. Instead, 
they are probing and often “ask questions, look about the car’s interior, prolong 
the encounter while looking for anomalies and evidence of wrongdoing, and, if 
suspicious, search the vehicle.”55 Officers’ conduct during investigatory stops is 
often both physically intrusive and emotionally intrusive; they often make use 
of handcuffs and ask intrusive questions.56 
Black drivers are not fooled by proffered pretextual traffic-safety 
justifications for investigatory stops—Professor Epp and his colleagues’ 
research reveals that black drivers notice and resent the intrusion.57 The 
discriminatory nature of police practices during stops is especially clear when 
comparing Epp and his colleagues’ interviews of black drivers and white drivers. 
When white drivers were asked about police stops, most described a fairly brief 
encounter, ending with either a ticket or a warning.58 Black drivers, by contrast, 
“poured forth story after story of demeaning stops, often rendered in 
excruciating detail.”59 For black drivers, the experience of being stopped by the 
police is one of lasting humiliation. 
 
49 Id. at 13-14. 
50 Id. at 8. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 53. 
53 Id. at 13. 
54 Id. at 78. 
55 Id. at 78-79. 
56 Id. at 11. 
57 Id. at 10. 
58 Id. at 112-13. 
59 Id. at 113. 
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III. THE REGULATION OF NOSY QUESTIONS 
What might police departments do to ease black citizens’ humiliation during 
police stops? This is a difficult question, because nosy questions are part and 
parcel of policing practices. Police ask intrusive questions and make 
investigatory stops because they are trained to do so.60 Often this behavior goes 
unexamined. In the vast majority of stops where nosy questions are asked—
police pull over some 50,000 drivers on a typical day—the driver simply bears 
the insult and the indignity of nosy questions.61 In other words, the situation ends 
far less tragically than it did in Bland’s case.62  
A. State v. Arreola-Botello 
Perhaps because most nosy questions go unexamined, courts generally 
consider the intrusion of such questions to be de minimis so long as the 
individual has been legally stopped. That doesn’t have to happen. In the Oregon 
Supreme Court case State v. Arreola-Botello,63 the court decided to more closely 
scrutinize the questions asked by officers. 
Arreola-Botello stemmed from the 2015 arrest of Mario Arreola-Botello by 
Oregon police officer Eric Faulkner.64 Faulkner arrested Arreola-Botello for 
failing to signal a turn. After Faulkner walked to Arreola-Botello’s car, he 
demanded that Arreola-Botello surrender his driver’s license, vehicle 
registration, and proof of insurance.65 Arreola-Botello turned over his license 
immediately but was unable to produce his registration and proof of insurance 
as quickly. While Faulkner waited for the other documents, he asked for consent 
to search Arreola-Botello’s car, to which Arreola-Botello responded, “Sure, 
okay.”66 As Officer Faulkner looked in the car, he observed a small bundle of 
what he believed to be methamphetamines on the car floor. Officer Faulkner 
then arrested Arreola-Botello.67 
Before trial, Arreola-Botello moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds 
that Faulkner “had violated his constitutional rights by unlawfully expanding the 
scope of the lawful traffic stop into matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop, 
such as whether [Arreola-Botello] possessed drugs.”68 The trial court rejected 
 
60 Id. (asserting that investigatory stops are planned intrusions). 
61 Goel & Phillips, supra note 42. 
62 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
63 451 P.3d 939 (Or. 2019) (en banc). 
64 Alex Zielinski, A New Ruling by Oregon’s Highest Court Could Curb the Over-Policing 
of Black Portlanders, PORTLAND MERCURY (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.portland 
mercury.com/news/2019/12/19/27664136/a-new-ruling-by-oregons-highest-court-could-
curb-the-over-policing-of-black-portlanders [https://perma.cc/VWZ3-RD6P]. 
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this argument because it characterized the time when Officer Faulkner was 
waiting for registration as an “unavoidable lull” in the traffic stop.69 As an 
unavoidable lull, it was constitutionally invisible and therefore acceptable to the 
court. On appeal, Arreola-Botello argued that the trial court should have 
suppressed the evidence because Faulkner’s line of questioning—specifically 
his request to search Arreola-Botello’s vehicle—”unlawfully expanded the 
scope of the traffic stop.”70 The appeals court rejected this argument.71  
The Oregon Supreme Court approached the case differently. The court’s 
opinion began by noting the statutory and constitutional limitations on an 
officer’s authority to investigate unrelated crimes during a traffic stop.72 The key 
issue for the court in Arreola-Botello was whether nosy questions—questions 
unrelated to the purpose of this stop—could be permitted.73 Several precedential 
Oregon decisions touched on these issues. For instance, in State v. Rogers,74 
where police questioning was at issue, the state argued that police questioning 
unrelated to a traffic stop or a request for consent to search during a traffic stop 
was only a de minimis intrusion.75 In another earlier case, State v. Watson,76 
while waiting for the driver’s license check during a minor traffic violation stop, 
the officer asked the driver whether it was true that he was dealing small amounts 
of marijuana and asked for consent to search the vehicle.77 Watson denied that 
this was the case, but another officer arrived on the scene and reported an odor 
of marijuana, which he believed to be emanating from the car.78 The officer 
searched the car based on probable cause and the defendant was arrested.79 The 
Oregon Supreme Court ultimately held that investigatory activities have to be 
reasonably related to the traffic stop.80  
In Arreola-Botello, the Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that the justification 
for a traffic stop delineates the lawful bounds of the stop.81 The state argued that 
Arreola-Botello’s rights under the Oregon Constitution were not violated 
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because the officer’s request for consent to search the defendant’s vehicle didn’t 
impose additional restraint beyond the stop itself.82 The state also argued that, 
because a request for consent to search during a legal stop does not further 
restrict a defendant’s liberty, such restrictions have no significance.83 The court 
disagreed with both of these lines of reasoning and stated that the salient issue 
involved the scope of the officer’s inquiry. Specifically, the court looked at 
whether the officer who seized the defendant was limited in the inquiries he 
could make during the stop.84  
The court insisted that there are limits not only on when a stop may be made 
but also on the purpose for which it may be conducted.85 The court explained: 
A stop that is reasonable for limited investigatory purpose is not necessarily 
reasonable for all purposes, and we see no reason to distinguish between 
the activities that law enforcement officers conduct during such a stop and 
the questions that they ask; both must be reasonably related to the purpose 
that permits the officer to stop an individual in the first place.86 
In other words, the officer’s questions in Arreola-Botello were not irrelevant. 
They mattered. In insisting on a threshold of reasonableness, the court required 
officers to at least in some way tie the questions asked during the stop to the 
reason for the stop. The marker of whether a stop was reasonable was not just 
the duration of the stop but rather the totality of the circumstances. An 
“unavoidable lull” in activities during the stop did not, according to the court, 
create an opportunity for the officer to ask unrelated questions.87 
CONCLUSION 
Why is it so important to regulate nosy questions as the Oregon Supreme 
Court has? First, and perhaps most importantly, nosy questions poison the 
relationship between police officers and people of color. We see this in the 
degrading interaction between Officer Brian Encinia and Sandra Bland. 
Encinia’s investigatory stop, followed by nosy personal questions entirely 
unrelated to the reason for the stop, incensed Bland and may have led to less 
compliance. Though Bland’s reaction may have been imprudent given the power 
imbalance between officer and driver, it is also understandable. It is insulting for 
an innocent person to be stopped for a minor traffic violation and then treated as 
if they have done something deeply criminal. The encounter between Encinia 
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We should regulate nosy questions because they are an intrusive affront to 
individual dignity and privacy, particularly to racial and ethnic minorities who 
have been subjected to discriminatory policing practices. To ask black and 
Latino drivers to ignore the insult of discriminatory policing practices simply 
adds insult to injury.  
The police also have a stake in eliminating nosy questions. As the tragic case 
of Sandra Bland demonstrates, an officer’s line of inquiry plays a significant role 
in facilitating compliance during a stop and subsequently impacts the level of 
trust that black and Latino citizens have in the police. It is far more difficult to 
achieve compliance (to say nothing of gaining assistance in fighting crime) if 
the people from whom the police are trying to secure cooperation are angered 
by their behavior.  
In Arreola-Botello, the Oregon Supreme Court offered a route to excise the 
practice of nosy questions, ruling that questions asked during the stop must be 
reasonably related to the reason for the stop.88 This is not the only solution, 
however. One simple way of beginning to restore trust between black and Latino 
communities and the police is to regulate the use of investigatory stops. Because 
police officers’ suspicions in investigatory stops often lead to unrelated nosy 
questions, police officers making fewer investigatory stops are less likely to 
engage in unreasonable and unrelated nosy questioning. 
 
88 Id. at 948. 
